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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
an implied agreement, based on acceptance of the agent's
plan, is necessary to afford him some semblance of ade-
quate protection. This is not to suggest that an agent
should have a cause of action for every useful bit of in-
formation he reveals and which is later used by cus-
tomers. He, of course, must bear the normal risks of not
being able to make a sale. But if a prospective customer
abuses the agent's services by appropriating a valuable
proposal (as in the instant case), an agreement should be
implied. If the courts continue not to recognize such a
promise as a matter of policy, then should not the legisla-
ture enact a statute similar to that in the real estate area 9
to at least clarify the agent's rights.
MONA SALYER LvxmD
Enforceability Of Temporary Binders Issued By
Life Insurance Companies
Simpson v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America'
At the solicitation of an agent of defendant insurance
company, plaintiff and her husband decided to take out a
policy on his life. The husband executed the non-medical
part of the application, and upon being told by the agent
that "When you give me the check for a payment on this
insurance, you are covered. When I receive your check,
you are covered as of then," he drew a check, payable to
the insurance company, for the first annual premium. The
check was cashed by the company the next day. Subse-
quently, the husband was given a physical examination
by a physician selected by the insurance company. The
results of the examination were satisfactory, except that
a "trace" of sugar was found in the urine. In such a case,
the application required that a sample of the urine tested
to sue for conversion of ideas in a situation such as here, but courts
have been very reluctant to recognize a property right in ideas. Even in
the jurisdictions where recovery is allowed, an agent must prove that his
idea was original, concrete and useful. An agent in the typical insurance
situation would probably be unable to meet this burden of proof. For a
discussion of the right to compensation for the unsolicited disclosure of
business ideas see NoT, Compensation For Unsolicited Disclosure of
Business Ideas, 21 Md. L. Rev. 139 (1961).
"1 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 2, § 17.
1227 Md. 393, 177 A. 2d 417 (1962).
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be sent to the home office of the company, which was done.
The analysis showed .16% of glucose and the company
requested the examining physician to complete a glucose
tolerance test on plaintiff's husband. Before this could be
done, plaintiff's husband was killed in an automobile acci-
dent. Several days later a representative of the insurance
company visited plaintiff and tendered her a refund of
the premium already paid, telling her that her husband
had not passed the physical examination and that the com-
pany, which knew of her husband's death, denied any
additional liability. Plaintiff brought an action to recover
under the policy as named beneficiary. The trial court
granted the insurance company's motion for a directed
verdict. The Court of Appeals found that a contract of in-
surance did arise as a result of the premium paid by plain-
tiff's husband and the receipt given him by the company,2
but remanded the case for a new trial on the issue of
whether plaintiff's husband met the standard of insur-
ability set by the insurance company.
The type of receipts in question - which have become
known as "binding slips" or "binders" - have been the
basis of much litigation.3 Binders are given by insurance
companies when the application for insurance is accom-
panied by a partial or full payment of the premium and
usually contain language to induce such payment in ad-
vance of acceptance.4 As the receipt normally provides
that the amount paid is non-refundable in the absence of
a rejection of the application, the insurer can be fairly
2 The receipt provided, in part, that:
"[I]f the required and completed Part 1 and the required and com-
pleted Part 2 of the application and such other information as may be
required by the Company are received by the Company at one of its
Home Offices and if the Company after the receipt thereof determines
to its satisfaction that the proposed insured was insurable )n the
later of the dates of said Parts 1 and 2 on the plan, for amounts, for
the benefits and at the premium rate applied for, the insurance in
accordance with and subject to the terms and conditions of the policy
applied for shall take effect as of the later of the dates of the required
and completed Parts I and 2." Id., 397.
'Mutual Fire Insurance Co. of Montgomery County v. Goldstein, 119 Md.
83, 86 A. 35 (1912). See generally: 2 A.L.R. 2d 943 (1948) ; CARNAHAN,
CONFLIc'r o LAWS AND LIFE INSURANCE CONTRACTS (1942), § 35; Comment,
Binding In8urance Receipts: Rights and Liabilities Arising Thereunder,
25 Fordham L. Rev. 484 (1956) ; Comment, Operation of Binding Receipts
in Life Insurance, 44 Yale L.J. 1223 (1935).
ASchwartz v. Northern Life Ins. Co., 25 F. 2d 555 (9th Cir. 1928);
Seiderman v. Herman Perla, Inc., et al., 268 N.Y. 188, 197 N.E. 190 (1935);
VANCE, INSURANCE (3d ed. 1951) § 40, p. 235:
"The binding slip is merely a written memorandum of the most
important terms of a preliminary contract of . . .insurance, intended
to give temporary protection pending the investigation of the risk
by the insurer, or until the issue of a formal policy."
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certain that the applicant will not withdraw from the
transaction.
Binding slips may be classified generally into two types.
One type, known as the "satisfaction" type, provides that
if the insurer is satisfied that, on the date of application
(or medical examination, whichever is specified in the
application) the applicant was an insurable risk, the insur-
ance will take effect from that date.5 The instant case falls
within this classification.' The second type of binding slip,
known as the "approval" type, provides that the applica-
tion must be approved by the home office and that, if such
approval is given, insurance will take effect as of the
date of the application.7 A third type of binding slip,
rarely used by life insurance companies, is that which pro-
vides for unconditional temporary insurance regardless of
applicant's insurability.8
The satisfaction type of binding slip presents few prob-
lems, for all that need be shown to recover on the policy is
that the applicant was insurable on the date of applica-
tion. The death or change in physical condition of the
applicant prior to acceptance of the application will have
no bearing in a suit for recovery under the policy if he
was insurable on that date.9
The approval type of building slip, however, is trouble-
some in that approval by the insurer is made a condition
precedent, and there can be no contract of insurance until
such approval is given.1" Even if the applicant was in-
surable at the date of the application, which would provide
him coverage under the satisfaction type, a subsequent
change in his condition prior to approval would result in
the rejection of the application. Meanwhile, the insurer
has had the benefit of the use of applicant's money during
the period between application and rejection. Should the
5 Wolfskill v. American Union Life Ins. Co., 237 Mo. App. 1142, 172 S.W.
2d 471 (1943) ; Duncan v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. 0o., 137 Ohio
St. 441, 31 N.E. 2d 88 (1940) ; Stonsz v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc.
of the U.S., 324 Pa. 97, 187 A. 403 (1936) ; 2 A.L.R. 2d 943, 986-87 (1948).
Cf. Maddox v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co. of Tennessee, 79 Ga. App. 164,
53 S.E. 2d 235 (1949) and Summers v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America,
337 S.W. 2d 562 (Mo. 1960).
6 Supra, n. 1, 402.
Gaunt v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 160 F. 2d 599 (2d Cir.
1947), concurring opinion; CARNAHAN, CONFLICT OF LAWS AND LIFE INsUR-
ANCE CONTRACrs (1942) § 35.
8 VANCE, INSURANCE (3d ed. 1951) § 40.
9 Comment, Binding Insurance Receipts: Rights and Liabilities Arising
Thereunder, 25 Fordham L. Rev. 484, 485 (1956).
10 Gaunt v. Jqohn Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 160 F. 2d 599 (2d
Cir. 1947).
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risk be accepted, the insurer would have collected a
premium for a period during which there was no risk.1
Thus, when an applicant receives this type of binder he
gets, in effect, nothing in return for the payment that
he has made.
The law of insurance binders is unsettled, 2 and few
principles can be stated. Those cases which hold that the
binding slip does not constitute a contract of insurance,
and deny recovery on the policy, do so on the strict rules
of contract law. 3 In the instant case, the Maryland Court
had no difficulty in finding that a contract of insurance
did exist, stating that "the receipt itself clearly under-
takes to express some obligations of the insurance com-
pany itself."' 4 Furthermore, "the payment in advance of
the premium constituted consideration for whatever
obligations the company assumed under the terms of its
receipt.' '15
The leading and most often cited case in support of the
holding that no insurance is effected by a binding slip is
Insurance Co. v. Young's Administrator.6 In that case,
however, the finding that there was no contract of insur-
ance was based upon the fact that the insurer rejected
the application and sent applicant a different policy, which
applicant did not accept. This amounted to a rejection by
applicant of a counter-offer. Thus, the effect of death or
a change in applicant's physical condition prior to accept-
ance was not considered.
In Olson v. American Central Life Ins. Co., " approval
was said to be a condition precedent to the formation of
a contract of insurance. A more elementary approach was
taken in Braman v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 8 where the court
looked upon the application for insurance as an offer which
is revoked by applicant's death prior to approval.19
" Liberty National Life Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 237 F. 2d 235, 237 (6th
Cir. 1956).
Supra, n. 10, 602.
'2 A.L.R. 2d 943 (1948).
Supra, n. 1, 399.
"Id., 403.
IA23 Wall. 85, 106 (U.S. 1875): "The entire subject [acceptance or
rejection of ,the application] was both affirmatively and negatively within
its [insurance company's] choice and discretion." This statement was
construed in Mohrstadt v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 115 F. 81, 84 (8th Cir.
1902), to mean that "a receipt in such a form is not an absolute assumption
of a risk temporarily . . . but . . . it is a qualified acceptance; the risk
taking effect only in the event that the application is accepted ....
17172 Minn. 511, 216 N.W. 225, 227 (1927).
1873 F. 2d 391 (8th Cir. 1934).
1Id., 397: "The application for insurance . . . was in effect an offer
which was revoked by the death of the applicant [offeror] .... " See also
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A case placed on the ground of offer and acceptance
cannot be easily disputed in situations where approval is
required to render the insurance operative. But even this
approach appears unsatisfactory where the requirement
is that the applicant be insurable at the date of applica-
tion and he is in fact insurable at that time, for the in-
surer has reserved the power to reject the application
only if it is not satisfied that, on the date of application,
applicant was not insurable. To have a defense to a suit
on the policy where applicant dies prior to the issuance
of a policy, the insurer must in good faith show that it
was dissatisfied."
It is on this point that the instant case was remanded
for a new trial, the Court stating that "the question of
insurability is of controlling importance .. -"I Whether
or not applicant was insurable as required by the applica-
tion goes to the basis for the insurer's dissatisfaction. The
Court said "that the clause [requiring applicant to be
insurable on the plan, for the amount, for the benefits and
at the premium rate applied for] means that the applicant
must meet an objective standard of insurability, and that
this standard is the company's own standard for the
plan . . . applied for . . Honest satisfaction is the
standard usually applied under such circumstances.23 Thus,
where applications are rejected upon the insurer's dis-
covery of applicant's death or change in physical condition,
and on no other basis, public policy considerations require
that the insurer should not escape liability.
Decisions denying recovery on the policy appear to be
accompanied by certain inequities, in that by the language
of the application the applicant may be misled into believ-
ing that he is insured, when he in fact is not covered. An
Boswell v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 197 Ga. 269, 29 S.E. 2d 71 (1944); Smiley v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 321 Mich. 60, 32 N.W. 2d 48 (1948);
Cheek v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 215 N.C. 36, 1 S.E. 2d 115 (1939) ; RESTAT-
ME NT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 35(f), p. 45.
C0omment, Life Insurance Binding Receipts, 33 Ill. L. Rev. 180, 184
(1938).
Supra, n. 1, 405; Mofrad v. New York Life Ins. Co., 206 F. 2d 491 (10th
Cir. 1953); Gonsoulin v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 152 La. 865,
94 So. 424 (1922) ; -Bearup v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of the U.S., 351
Mo. 326, 172 S.W. 2d 942 (1943) ; Raymond v. National Life Ins. Co., 40
Wyo. 1, 273 P. 667 (1929). For cases not requiring that applicant be in-
surable in order to give rise to a contract see: Ransom v. The Penn Mutual
Life Insurance Company, 43 Cal. 2d 420, 274 P. 2d, 633 (1954) and Life
Ins. Co. of No. America v. DeChiaro, 68 N.J. Super. 93, 172 A. 2d 30 (1961),
where applicant was not insurable under the plan applied for, but the
insurer was held liable for the face value -of the policy applied for.
2 Supra, n. 1, 406.
RESTATnMENT, CONrRACrS (1932) § 265, Comment (a), pp. 380-381.
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attempt by several courts to correct these inequities has
been a prime factor in decisions which have found that a
contract was made, and that recovery on the policy should
be permitted.
A leading authority in support of the view that a bind-
ing slip affords interim coverage is Gaunt v. John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co. 4 The Gaunt case exemplifies the
"modern trend to hold [such] receipts ... ambiguous and
resolve the ambiguity against the insurer. '"25
The approach of the modern trend centers on the word-
ing of insurance forms, particularly applications and re-
ceipts. The language used is quite often ambiguous and
misleading to the layman, although understood by the
soliciting agents of insurers who provide the forms. It is
on this ground that many of the more recent cases have
been decided against the insurance companies.2" But it is
the Gaunt case that takes the strongest stand in regard
to the ambiguity of these forms to the layman. Judge
Learned Hand wrote that such an application would "go
to persons utterly unacquainted with the niceties of life
insurance, who would read it colloquially. 27 Thus, "It is
the understanding of such persons that counts....
Judge Hand also gave a warning to the insurance com-
panies, stating that "insurers who seek to impose upon
words of common speech an esoteric significance intelli-
gible only to their craft, must bear the burden of any
resulting confusion. ' 29 He goes on to point out that "the
canon contra proferentum is more rigorously applied in
insurance than in other contracts, in recognition of the
difference between the parties in their acquaintance with
the subject matter. '30
There is revealed a growing policy, where there are
ambiguities present, to decide the cases on that ground
rather than on the basis of simple contract law.31 This
"160 F. 2d 599 (2d Cir. 1947).
21 Life Ins. Co. of No. America v. DeChiaro, 68 N.J. Super. 93, 172 A. 2d
30 (1961).
"Liberty National Life Insurance Co. v. Hamilton, 237 F. 2d 235 (6th
Cir. 1956); Gaunt v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 160 F. 2d 599 (2d
Cir. 1947); Western and Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Vale, 213 Ind. 601, 12
Ind. 601, 12 N.E. 2d 350 (1938) ; Hart v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 258 N.Y.S. 711
(1932) ; 2 A.L.R. 2d 943 (1948).
"Supra, n. 24, 601.
21 Supra, n. 24, 601.
2 Supra, n. 24, 602.
so Supra, n. 24, 602. Cf. Penn., Etc., Ins. Co. v. Shirer, 224 Md. 530, 536,
168 A. 2d 525 (1961).
u Supra, n. 25; Comment, 8upra, n. 20.
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would seem to be the best method of doing justice in
such cases.
The most desirable result - in terms of alleviating
some of the confusion which clouds the subject - would
be to place the parties to insurance transactions on a more
equal footing in their understanding of the subject matter
by eliminating ambiguous and misleading phraseology. A
move to simplify and clarify the language of forms is in
order in light of the changing judicial attitude which con-
strues the ambiguous language of the binder against the
insurance company. Some advancement might have been
expected in this area as a result of a survey taken of in-
surance executives several years ago. The results of that
survey showed that, as between the two types of binders,
the satisfaction type is favored. 2 But the cases illustrate
the lack of any significant change in types of binders being
used. It has also been suggested that the use of binding
slips be limited to this type by statutory provision.8 This
seems essential in order to achieve any substantial and
permanent clarification.
A second, but perhaps more drastic, solution would be
to give soliciting agents the same authority possessed by
general agents.8 4 Accompanied by a change in operational
procedures whereby the company would afford coverage
from the date of application while reserving the power to
cancel the policy should investigation show the applicant
to be a bad risk, this change would put both parties in a
position in which there could be little room for misunder-
standing concerning coverage.8 5
J. FREDERICK SHARER
Comment, Operation of Binding Receipts in Life Insurance, 44 Yale
L.J. 1223, 1229-1230 and fn. 33. (1935).
Comment, supra, n. 9.
5 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 48A, § 107(c)
"A life insurance agent is hereby defined to be any individual acting
under written authority from a life insurance company . . . having
authority . . . to solicit insurance for such company . . . but without
the power or authority to issue or countersign policies or otherwise
bind the company ... for or through which he acts as soliciting agent."
29 Am. Jur. 585, Insurance, § 193:
"[A] soliciting agent with power to solicit, receive, and report
applications has no power to accept them and make contracts of
insurance .... "
I In terms of operational procedure, such a change would place life
insurance companies on the same basis as casualty and property insurers.
See the New York Standard Fire Insurance Policy, McKINNEY'S CONSOL.
LAws OF N.Y. (1949), Art. 7, Insurance, § 168.
See Comment, supra, n. 20, 186, In which Professor Havighurst suggests
that life insurance companies would "do well to adopt the receipt form
providing for unconditional temporary insurance."
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